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Abstract
This article examines the implications of the growing presence of the Tablighi Jamaat
in Joygram, a Muslim-majority village in rural West Bengal, India, drawing on
ﬁeldwork conducted between  and . The analysis of reformist Islam as a
moral regeneration movement embedded in dharma and catalysing an alternative
modernity contributes to the scholarship on lived experiences of Islam, modernity,
and ethics. The Tablighi Jamaat in Joygram gains popularity in a political
economic context of moral degradation and marginalization, which inspires
engagements with globally resonant modern and anti-modern models of the self
enveloped in the practice, discourse, and performance of Islamic reformism. These
models mutually interact and conﬂict with locally particular practices and
exclusionary categorizations. On the village level, the drive towards modernity
ensues in conﬂicts over moral personhood and social exchanges. On the societal
level, the modern aspirations of Joygrami Tablighis go beyond piety to ‘good
culture’ and respected citizenship, and are embedded in anti-modern critiques of
the hegemonic categorizations of the secular nation-state by which they are
nevertheless conﬁned. It is suggested that reformist Islam should not be
misunderstood as pre-modern, anti-secular, or secular, but might better be called
‘post-secular’ because it encompasses those ideologies in vernacularized forms on
the basis of a different ideal conception of society. Islamic reformism in Joygram
may resonate with moral regeneration and reactionary movements elsewhere. This
analysis of the Tablighi Jamaat demonstrates the potential challenges social
movements face in the transition to alternative modernities.
* The article draws on ethnographic ﬁeldwork undertaken between October  and
August .
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Introduction
The presence of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) in West Bengal, India, has been
limited until recent decades, but is rapidly growing.1 In the early s an
increasing number of young men in Joygram—a Muslim-majority village
in West Bengal—were joining the Tablighi Jamaat, a transnational Islamic
missionary movement of lay preachers that was founded in  by alumni
of the Darul Uloom Deoband Islamic seminary in northern India. The
reformist Deobandi school of thought subsequently spread through its
vastly expanding network of madrasas and the TJ to all countries where
Muslims live.2 Joygrami men and women who do not themselves
become members are nonetheless inﬂuenced by Da’wa (proselytization)
via frequently organized gatherings. In Joygram, the imams in local
mosques are Deobandi, the local madrasas follow the Deobandi
curriculum, and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, a Deobandi organization of
Islamic scholars, frequently organizes gatherings, including sermons.3
Reformist Islam is, at times, presented as the ‘antimodern antithesis’ to
liberal secularism (Deeb : ). This is not only a misrepresentation of
reformist Islam but also rests on a simplistic notion of modernity as
secularity, and an equally simplistic deﬁnition of the latter: a decreasing
relevance of religion, ﬁrst in the public sphere and, eventually, also in
the private sphere. Although the TJ does express critiques of modernity,
the reality is more complex.
This article proposes an analysis of Islamic reformism through the lens
of ethics because it avoids a narrow focus on piety. Instead, it allows for a
wide variety of values and moral models, with sources in- and outside of
religion, to play a role. Moreover, an ethnography of ethics does not
assume people’s obedience to a static set of rules but rather unveils the
complex negotiations of conﬂicting moral demands and active
1 I was told in interviews and conversations (with TJ participants, Deobandi maulānās,
and ordinary Muslims) that the TJ and the Deoband had hardly any public presence
until the s. Since then, many Bengali Muslims have gradually converted from
Barelwi to Deobandi Islam.
2 For more on the Tablighi Jamaaat, Deoband, and its madrasas, see Ahmad ;
Gupta ; Masud a; Metcalf ; Sikand .
3 I refer to those Joygramis who explicitly call themselves Deobandi, who dress
accordingly, and who explicitly reﬂect on their Islamic practice in line with the reformist
doctrine, including both lay Muslims and clergy, as ‘reformists’ or ‘Deobandi’.
‘Tablighis’ are involved with the Tablighi Jamaat and are Deobandis by implication.
Furthermore, I focus in this article on male Muslim Joygramis, since it is almost
exclusively men who are explicitly Deobandi reformists or Tablighi Jamaat participants.
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construction of normative subjectivities (see also Keane ; Laidlaw
; Lambek ).
Ironically, the Tablighi Jamaat itself performs aspects of the modernity it
challenges. The result is friction on both sides: with other villagers insofar as
it is modern, and with the state, or a global hegemony of modernity, insofar
as it is ‘anti-modern’. Exploring the presence of the TJ in Joygram, where
its inﬂuence is currently expanding, can offer interesting insights into the
multifaceted aspirations and controversial positionality of reformist
Muslims and contribute to the scholarship on lived experiences of Islam
and modernity. Before commencing with a detailed discussion of the
theoretical context, the next section will situate the ethnographic research
(–) in the concrete historical and political context.
Contextualizing Islamic reformism in Joygram
The partition of Bengal in the wake of Indian independence from the
British empire left  million Muslims behind on the Indian side to form
a minority of ‘second-class citizens’ (Jalais : ). The marginalized
Muslims consented that to live safely meant proclaiming ‘allegiance to
India, to communal harmony and to secularism’ (Chatterji : ).
The coming to power of the Left Front (a coalition of communist parties)
in West Bengal in  did not structurally change bhadralok (upper
caste Hindu ‘gentlefolk’) superiority, despite its discourse of radical
leftism focused on the annihilation of class (Chatterjee ). In the
initial years of the regime, the Left Front successfully improved the
conditions of poor and middle-class peasants and daily labourers, but the
homogeneous hegemony of the bhadralok combined with communist
politics in fact resulted in the central paradox that, despite the intense
politicization of society, communal marginalization was depoliticized
(favouring class politics) and structural violence against minorities tacitly
reproduced (Chatterjee ; see Sachar Committee ).
The Deoband madrasas and the Tablighi Jamaat were, from the outset,
projects to protect a distinctive Muslim identity in a British colony with a
Hindu-majority, but the vulnerable minority status of Muslims required a
certain quietism.4 In the early s, when Muslims made up  per cent
4 See footnote .
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of the population,5 Deobandi organizations still felt the need to
repeatedly proclaim their loyalty to the Indian nation6—perhaps even
more so given the context of growing support for the Hindu-nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party.7 However, the de jure availability of welfare
schemes did instil a sense of entitlement to the bare bones of modern
development (cf. Hansen ). There was hope, at least among
Joygrami Deobandis, that their moral reforms would help them attain
the respectability of ‘ﬁrst-class citizens’, while the participation of fellow
Muslims in a solidary network helped them cope with their exclusion.
Muslims’ increasing awareness of political self-determination stands in a
complex mutual relation to the rise of the Trinamul Congress (TMC)
and its identity politics. The TMC defeated the Left Front in  with
populist identity politics that capitalized on the unabated deprivation of
Muslims, emboldening them to develop a stronger identity and
political voice.8
The narrative of the ‘decay of public life’ is common throughout India
(Hansen : ) and was particularly strong in West Bengal in the direct
aftermath of TMC triumph. Joygrami Muslims claimed that the Left
Front had rejected dharma, and that its revival could restore order.
Dharma is a term usually associated with Hinduism, but in common
5 Census of  Available at: http://censusindia.gov.in/census/Religion_PCA.
html, [accessed  February ].
6 In neighbouring Muslim-majority Pakistan and Bangladesh, more overtly political
Islamic and Islamist organizations gained more traction than in India, partly because
they were banned in India and partly because, for most Indian Muslims, secular
democracy has been too integral a part of political life to be questioned (Ahmad :
; for Pakistan, see Iqtidar ; for Bangladesh, see Huq , Shehabuddin ; for
Sri Lanka, see Haniffa ; cf. Osella and Osella ).
7 The BJP won the  general elections under the leadership of Narendra Modi.
8 The TMC’s identity politics and the reintroduction of communal language in West
Bengal have also allowed for the popularity of the Hindu-nationalist BJP to spill over
into West Bengal in the years following my ﬁeldwork, as I learned during research into
the national elections in West Bengal in  (Pool ). Since , communal riots
have become more common in West Bengal (whereas in previous years most violence
was related to party politics). During a visit to Joygram in  I was told about
communal riots in a neighbouring village, which were unknown in the area in –
. Communal relations in the village remain good, possibly because of the majority
position of Muslims in Joygram. Promises by the TMC to improve the Muslims’
situation were still felt to be mainly empty, and often failed to be realized due to
continued corruption. Meanwhile, the TJ continued to grow in popularity in ,
partly in contradistinction to the increasingly negative public discourse on Muslims by
the BJP, and partly because of the continued spread of supposedly ‘purer’ forms of Islam.
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Bengali parlance it denotes a holistic ethics of justice and order that any
human being is expected to enjoy by virtue of being human, whether
Hindu, Muslim, or otherwise.
One cannot, however, locate oneself outside the narrative of moral
decay: when corruption has seeped into every corner of society,
engagements with the immoral environment are inevitable. This elicited
a particular sense of individual responsibility from Muslims in Joygram
and elsewhere (Das : ), and the ofﬁcial discourse of the TJ was
that a better society starts with improving oneself. There was ample
complaint (among Muslim Joygramis) that Muslims just wanted to farm
rather than progress; that those Muslims who were educated were
‘Hindu-ized’ and had forgotten Islam; that Muslim boys worked as
gunmen because they just wanted money; and, generally, that they lived
up to the stereotype of being ‘badmāś’ (scoundrels). It was, at least in
part, considered the fault of Muslims themselves that the bhadralok still
ruled West Bengal and that they suffered from violence and exclusion.
This narrative always had the same conclusion: Bengali Muslims ‘are
very far from Islam’, especially the ‘stupid’ (bokā) people visiting the
shrine.9 This was due to a previous lack of Islamic seminaries and the
absence of the TJ. In contrast, the Deoband seminary, which instructs
and spreads the ‘real Islam’ (satḥik Islām), was founded in northern
India. So Bengali Muslims needed to be reminded of the proper ethics
and the ritual practices of Islam. It was in this context that Islamic
reformism, heralded by the TJ, gained widespread popularity.
The (anti)modern ethics of the Tablighi Jamaat:
theoretical context
In Joygram, Islamic reformism found expression in ways that emerged out
of particular local virtue ethics that merged Islamic theology and practice
with South Asian ideas of being and sociality. It revolved around a
generation of dynamic related persons, through ritual and everyday
9 ‘Hindu-ization’ and religious illiteracy are very common tropes among Muslim
reformers in South Asia. Cf. Ahmad ; Ahmad and Reifeld ; Huq ;
Shehabuddin . It might be particularly strong in West Bengal, where Muslims are
poor and badly educated relative to Bengali Hindus and to Muslims elsewhere in India
(Sachar Committee ); where most Muslims are descendants of converts (Eaton
); and where there is a history of syncretic religious practice. For the colonial roots
of opposition between the ‘proper’ Arab Muslims and Bengali Muslims, see Ahmed ().
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bio-moral exchanges, was informed by the political and economic
environment of post-communist West Bengal and secular India, and
resonated with globally circulating models of modernity. Various moral
models have become encompassed within dharma. The semantic and
aesthetic expression of the multifaceted dharma in this case was Islamic,
because Joygrami Muslims were essentialized in the Muslim jāti
(community) from birth and continuously throughout their lifetime.10
So, Islamic reformism was a reform within dharma—and any such
reform touches upon fundamental moral ideas of what constitutes a
person and how one relates to others. Indeed, one of the reasons the
turn to reformism created considerable moral unrest among my
participants is because the project of Islamic reformism is not limited to
religious reform, but is a holistic, all-encompassing moral regeneration
project which involves a profound reconﬁguration of being in the world.
Some aspects of this moral regeneration project are modern, some
are anti-modern. Modernity here does not chieﬂy refer to historical,
political, and economic developments.11 Instead, I primarily refer to
sets of normative attitudes, values, and subjectivities that underpin,
drive, and result from these developments, especially those encapsulated
in secularism and liberalism. Secularism refers at once to a political
ideology (the separation of religious and worldly powers, non-
discrimination on the basis of religion, and the management of religious
difference) and an epistemological and moral position (the valuation of
belief-independent rationality; privatization and decrease of religiosity;
and the rejection of tradition, the sacred, and the transcendent in
favour of empirical evidence, logic, and the immanent). Secularism is
deeply interwoven with the values of social liberalism (equality,
individual freedom, tolerance, and plurality) and economic liberalism
(free market economy and individual [property] rights).
10 As a result of the secular logic of the Indian nation-state and local cosmogonic ideas.
See Pool .
11 Key among which are industrialization and technological innovation, and the rise of
(commodity) capitalism, (colonial) nation-states, and mass democratization. Other chief
developments include: the upsurge of the social sciences as the backbone of
(technocratic) policy and bureaucracy, the ordering of society in separate domains
(public domains of politics and the economy; private domains of religion and the
family), the measurement of well-being as economic growth, and the globalization of
culture and aesthetic representation in self-reﬂective performance rather than
ritual symbolism.
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Although these sets of values are the chief reference point, modernity is not
a singular, static, and coherent project—and neither is Islam. Across the
world ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt ) have emerged in a mutually
transformative interaction with local normativities and globally circulating
normative imaginaries (Taylor ).12 The historical processes that came
to fruition in the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had
vernacular origins elsewhere and blended with Western imports via
colonial administrations, such as in British India, resulting in particular
(post)-colonial modernities (see, for example, Cohn ; Dirks ).
Nevertheless, globally we can observe two elements that are core to the
project of modernity: self-determination and self-making (the right—and
duty—to be true to oneself, including moral responsibility), and inner
conviction (embodying immanence, individualism, and authenticity).13
These are key elements in Islamic reformism as practised in Joygram.
The idea of inner conviction is well captured in Hansen’s () notion
of ‘cool passion’, which I employ as an ‘ideal-type’ lens to explore the
modern in Joygram. Hansen (: ) traces the development of
a modern ‘political theology of conviction’ and argues that the ideal of
a proper self ‘equipped with interiority and conviction’ has become a
globally inﬂuential model. The ethics of conviction requires
transcendence of the lower self and expunging of the unreﬂective
traditions of the past, to acquire ‘purer … more interiorized and more
reﬂexive modalities of belief, religious practice, political aspiration and
cultural sensibility’ in order to become modern individuals guided by
‘well-deﬁned and puriﬁed cultural, moral or religious principles’ (ibid.:
). As such, the notion of ‘cool passion’ captures very well what it
means to be modern, without assuming a particular kind of secularity
as absence of religion. Whereas in many modernization theories,
religion appears as a tradition that chains one to a pre-modern way of
12 The work on modernity, piety movements, and Islamist organizations in Cairo
(Mahmood ; Hirschkind ), Lebanon (Deeb ), Bangladesh (Huq ,
; Shehabuddin ), and Pakistan (Iqtidar ; Jamal ) demonstrates that the
kind of modernity which arises from public piety has vernacular origins and meanings,
and is indigenously produced rather than a weaker copy of Western modernity.
Similarly, studies of participation in and the inﬂuence of the TJ have highlighted
alternative modes of globalization (Noor ), cosmopolitanism (Horstmann ),
secularity (Metcalf ) as well as new modes of religiosity (Janson ) and intimate
relationships (White ).
13 My understanding of these terms draws on a wide range of literature, including: Asad
; Berman ; Giddens ; Keane ; Mahmood ; Milbank and Pabst ;
Stacey ; Taylor , .
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life, Islamic reformism can be a catalyst for the modern ethics of
conviction, not unlike secular modernization projects.
Because self-realization and inner conviction are often reﬂected in
Islamic reformism, as well as other modern aspects—a view of Islam as
a religious ‘system’; a high degree of rationalization; a rejection of past
authorities; a new emphasis on human will; growing individualism; and
privatization—it is sometimes called essentially modern as opposed to
anti-modern (see, for example, Robinson ).14 But the Joygrami
experience suggests that this is still an incomplete interpretation as
reformism also expresses a critique of modernity.
Joygramis express a desire for moral regeneration with explicit reference
to the drawbacks of modern liberty and individualism: greed-driven party
politics, an exploitative market economy, and a malfunctioning secularism
that allows for discrimination against minorities. Deobandi reformists in
Joygram draw on a macrocosmic notion of dharma which deﬁes a
separation of society into moral (religious) and morally neutral (political
and economic) spheres, and seeks to revive morality in private and public
life as a whole. They defy the (mis)rule of reason with a re-enchantment
of transcendence in all aspects of life and an embodied virtue ethics.
These anti-modern sentiments resonate with Comaroff’s ()
discussion of ‘uncool’ passion, in a critical evaluation of Hansen’s ‘cool
passion’. Across the globe, she observes a ‘rejection of the cool passion
of modern reason’ (ibid.: ), expressed in a ‘hankering for transcendent
imperatives’ and a yearning ‘for a theologico-politics that can inspire a
bloodless world with sublime conviction’ (ibid.: ). This ‘anti-modernist’
revival expresses ‘a discomfort with secular notions of society, politics
and morally-neutral public life, a desire to erase the line between
the metaphysical and the mundane’ (ibid.: ). An analysis of Islamic
reformism in Joygram would not be complete without also attending to
the ‘anti-modernist’ aspects so poignantly described by Comaroff. The
discussion of globally circulating models of modern and anti-modern
selfhood, as captured in ‘cool’ and ‘uncool’ passions, are useful as a
heuristic lens through which to explore the idiosyncrasies of Joygram
and to draw out particular points of tension.
The ﬁrst part of the article will discuss the life trajectories of three
Deobandi reformists in Joygram. It then turns to changes in aesthetics
and performance. Next, the article focuses on two instances in which
14 See also, for example, Ahmad ; Eickelman ; Eickelman and Anderson ;
Eickelman and Piscatori ; Jamal ; Starrett .
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tensions surfaced between the urge to reform and customary practices or
alternative modes of modernization, and discusses these tensions as
reﬂecting an instance of ‘extraordinary ethics’. The last section
examines the lack of a shared logic between the Indian nation-state and
Islamic reformism. The failure of the Indian state to live up to the
secular ideals of the modern state has resulted in a limited depoliticized
space for navigation for Muslims reiﬁed in a pre-modern cultural-
religious community. Therefore, there has emerged a paradoxical
tension between the piety movement’s own objectiﬁcation of Islam (as a
religion that is the source of ethics) and the logic of categorization of
the ambiguously secular nation-state, on the one hand, and Joygrami
reformists’ aspirations for both holistic ethical renewal and inclusion in
the nation-state, on the other hand.
Trajectories to conviction: three Joyrami Islamic reformists
The following life stories of three Joygrami men—Masiruddin, Wahed,
and Faizul—trace their motivations for being drawn to the material and
ideological environment, and tease out both local particularities and
global resonances. These stories exemplify that the aspirations of active
TJ participants in Joygram were a complex combination of ‘cool’ and
‘uncool’ passions: of modern, global forms of reﬂexive, interiorized
conviction with a postmodern desire to imbue public life with morality
and mystical transcendence. These life trajectories reﬂect individual
variability and pragmatic, situational motivations, and demonstrate that
the shared inculcation of an embodied, pious conviction does not
negate the fact that Joygrami Muslims engage with reformist Islam in
much more ambiguous and ambivalent ways than some studies of the
TJ suggest (see, for instance, the studies in Masud a—but see also
Horstmann ). However, underlying the idiosyncrasies, the
remarkable congruence in the modus operandi of the TJ across the
world reveals shared modes of conviction and models of personhood,
into which these individual stories can give insights.15 For instance, in
their sermons, the TJ encouraged a move away from text- and
rule-based, externally enforced morality to an embodied ethics that
15 From South Asia (Metcalf ; Siddiqi ; White ) via Southeast Asia
(Horstmann ; Noor ), and Africa (Ahmed ; Janson ) to Europe and
North America (see Masud a; Pieri ).
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unites this world and the afterlife in an all-encompassing moral order (cf.
Ali : ); salvation would only follow from virtuous behaviour in this
world. The emphasis was on physical, social orthopraxy rather than
intellectual orthodoxy based only upon texts (cf. Janson : ). The
following narratives show how Joygrami Tablighis tried to embody the
Sunnah (Prophet’s tradition) in their embrace of an Islam that was highly
affective and sensory, challenging a fully interiorized, modern sense of self
in their performance of virtue. Another aspect that unites the three
‘narratives of becoming’ is a sense of moral failure or void, in which
conviction arrives as a ‘miracle of truth’ in a time of darkness, a ‘turning
point that enables one to become a full person’ (Hansen : ; cf.
Comaroff : ), not unlike Tablighis’ narratives in Gambia (Janson
: ) or Pentecostal testimonies in the United States (Luhrmann ).
Although I focus here predominantly on male Tablighis, I include the
only two Joygrami women who actively participated in the TJ. The
Tablighis’ transitions to reformism were often looked upon by other
Joygramis with a wary scepticism, as not everyone held a coherent
reformist Islamic theology. So although I can positively assert that every
Muslim in Joygram was inﬂuenced by reformism to some extent, and
most were consciously aware of the changes in ritual practices and
Islamic doctrine, the ways in which these changes affected ordinary life
did not go uncontested, as will be discussed in later sections of this article.
Masiruddin Khadim
Masiruddin Khadim16 was a relatively wealthy businessman in his early
thirties who lived in Joygram, a village in West Bengal. The Khadims,
the largest extended family in Joygram, were the ‘caretakers’ (musualis)
of land now used for a large cattle market just outside Joygram, which
covered approximately  bighā ( acres). The land was donated to
the Khadims by a Hindu landlord ( jamidār) whose child had allegedly
been cured by Champa Bibi, who is buried in the shrine on this land.
Abu Bakr Khadim, Masiruddin’s father, was the caretaker of this shrine
which was frequented by Muslims and Hindus alike.17 Although
16 All names, including place names, are pseudonyms, except for the names of
well-known public ﬁgures (such as Siddiqullah Chowdhury Saheb) and well-known
places (for example, Delhi).
17 The property was listed under the State WAQF Board in . WAQF properties are
inalienable endowments of the Muslim community, to be used for charitable or religious
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Masiruddin was of the caretaker lineage, his family ran a part of the cattle
market independently and he also worked as a contractor. He was not
actively involved with any political party but was a prominent presence
at important political events and closely followed the news regarding
Siddiqullah Chowdhury Saheb’s political party, the All India United
Democratic Front (AIUDF).
Masiruddin was a vocal proponent of the Deobandi reformist Islam and
an occasional participant in the Tablighi Jamaat. One day I asked
Masiruddin to tell me why he converted to reformist Islam and joined
the Tablighi Jamaat. He explained that he had been an ordinary boy,
Muslim by name, but not giving Islam much thought. He had been
living the ‘lifestyle’ and although he was a bit embarrassed about his
previously un-Islamic lifestyle, he showed me pictures of that time with
a big smile on this face. Like many rural boys aspiring to urban
masculinity, he had the pictures taken in a studio, wearing a transparent
shirt, tight jeans, large sunglasses, and a clean-shaven chin.
At some point in his twenties, Masiruddin started on a quest for ethical
guidance: despite how exciting his life was, he felt a moral void. Inspired
by his Hindu friends he started to read the Hindu scriptures, and
afterwards the Christian Bible. But he came to the realization that the
Qur’an, directly given by Allah, provided the most complete system for
life, both scientiﬁc and ethical, and that he had to follow the ‘right
path’ and immerse himself in Islam. Masiruddin spent four months at
the global headquarters of the Tablighi Jamaat in Delhi and changed
his lifestyle: he started wearing a white kurta and an untrimmed beard
under a shaven upper lip, prayed ﬁve times a day, fasted during
Ramadan, and attended all important local Islamic congregations. He
became interested in the scientiﬁc value of the lessons of the Qur’an
and the Hadith, rationalizing the logic of self-discipline and the
associated aesthetics, and came to believe that the Qur’an is the
original source of bijñān (science).18
purposes, and have to provide ofﬁcial accounts to the State WAQF Board. The Khadim’s
WAQF property included the shrine, the graveyard (mājār), the land used for the cattle
market and a banyan tree plantation, and the Idgah (enclosed space for prayer on
auspicious Islamic days).
18 Rationality is not an end in itself, as Huq (: ) equally observes for a women’s
study circle in Bangladesh, but ‘a mere modality for facilitating the formation of a scripted
Islamic pious-revivalist personhood and public’. But whereas in Muslim-majority
Bangladesh the performance of rational pious personhood was in turn part of a larger
political project of the Jamaat-i-Islami to secure power, in Muslim-minority India, the
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Masiruddin considered shrine worship as one of the greatest sins and
refused to follow in his father’s footsteps as a caretaker. He continued,
however, to work as a contractor and to be involved in local patronage,
appearing on political stages. For Masiruddin, these practices were not
anathema to his strong belief that Islam is a ‘total way of life’, as he
would say. In fact, his re-evaluation of Islamic ethics and aesthetics not
only provided him with the techniques for self-cultivation but also with
a morally higher status in the marketplace and the political landscape.
Masiruddin ﬁrmly believed that a better society begins with individuals
becoming better people. For this reason, he spoke very highly of the
Islamic mission schools. The most important and distinguishing aspect
of these private boarding schools—the ﬁrst of which emerged in
Howrah in —is not the curriculum but the strict regimen and
discipline, and the seamless inculcation of an Islamic disposition within
the larger project of the making of a modern Muslim middle class.19
For Masiruddin, it was important that mission education would not
only beneﬁt Muslims, but the entire country. ‘The Muslims lag behind,
and thanks to the mission schools they will “rise up” ( piche theke utḥe yāy).
India is a democratic country, and I am a part of this country, so if
I study better, if I can do a government job (cākri) well, then that’s good
for all of India. Muslims can’t lag behind.’
Masiruddin in particular also gloriﬁed Al Qaeda and the Taliban as the
most peaceful people in the world, living examples of Muslims struggling
to follow the right path against the evil inﬁltrations of (Western) capitalism
and consumerism. But at the same time, to participate in the liberal
democracy of India, he felt it was vital to distance himself from the
pervasive image of the ‘bad’ or disloyal Muslim. Masiruddin deeply
lamented the suspicion around, and stereotypes of, Muslims, in both
India and other parts of the world, and wanted to demonstrate that
Islam is peaceful and that Muslims, if they follow Islam properly, would
foster peace instead of violence.
more humble and individualized aim with regard to the state was to gain
inclusive citizenship.
19 The Islamic Mission School in Howrah was founded under the name Al Ameen
Mission School, which now has  branches across West Bengal. In Joygram, a branch
of a similar institution, the Al Hilal Mission School, was opened in . Al Ameen and
Al Hilal mission schools are each managed by a board of private members, usually
middle-class Muslim men from Kolkata. The schools follow the curriculum of the West
Bengal Board of Secondary Education complemented with a minimum of Islamic
subjects. See also Gupta : –.
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Wahed Khadim
The ﬁrst time I met Masiruddin’s brother Wahed, he had a charismatic
appearance, in his clean white pāñjābi (white trousers) and white tụpi,
with an untrimmed beard and hair growing down the back of his neck.
His charisma grew as he told me about the TJ with visceral enthusiasm.
His father Abu Bakr, in a locally unusual, green version of the Islamic
dress, also with long hair and a grey goatee, seemed to listen to him in
a similar subdued manner, as I did. When I asked Abu Bakr whether
he participated in the TJ as well, his answer was, ‘[No], I stay at the
shrine (āstānā)’, and they showed me a dusty picture of a colourful
tomb-like structure with him posing in front of it. Wahed’s smile
suddenly became uncomfortable. It was soon clear to me that this
household, with the guardian of a saint’s tomb and two TJ participants
living under the same roof, was the exemplary microcosm of the larger
ethical transitions taking place in Joygram.
Wahed had been one of the ﬁrst to join the TJ in Joygram, some eight
years previously. He said he had felt inspired by the TJ to ‘uplift’ the
morally backward Muslims in West Bengal after an encounter with a
group of travelling preachers visiting a nearby village. Together with a
young day labourer called Ibrahim, he was the driving force behind the
TJ’s activities in Joygram. In his daily life, Wahed was primarily
preoccupied with the paddy ﬁelds and he spent his Saturdays in the ofﬁce
at the cattle market, but his involvement with the TJ and the outings were
gradually taking up more of his time. During my  months in the village,
he went twice on a four-month tour to Delhi, every month for three days
to nearby villages, and a few times for  days to villages in other districts
in West Bengal. As he was probably the wealthiest of the regular
participants, he acted as a patron: whenever groups of Tablighis from
other villages visited Joygram, he took care of most of the expense of
feeding them and his house was the place where meals were prepared. He
greatly enjoyed the solidarity among the Tablighis, as well as the Da’wa
(proselytization) itself. He was a passionate speaker and an austere teacher
of reform to the other villagers, which was not always appreciated.
His wife Pompa also participated in the TJ; she went for two three-day
tours during my stay (in contrast to Masiruddin’s wife, who worked as a
nurse and barely covered her hair). Pompa showed a genuine interest in
learning the Hadith, and spent her rare spare time reading it.
I increasingly overheard her passing on to other women in the hamlet
what she had learned on the outings, with a newly gained conﬁdence.
Whereas previously she had barely left the house (and, in fact, grew
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up in the house opposite it), meeting only relatives and the occasional
neighbour, she now engaged in an international network of women,
which ﬁlled her with awe. She was one of the ﬁrst women to wear a
burqa when going outside of the hamlet, a new phenomenon in this area.
Wahed applied for a place at the Al-Hilal Mission School in Joygram
for his eldest daughter, long before its doors were open. His youngest
daughter would attend the girls’ madrasa that had recently opened in a
nearby village. He had great plans for his only son: he would be highly
educated both in Islamic as well as in general subjects, so that he would
succeed in life, but most of all, so that he could spread Islam across the
world, since he would be ﬂuent in both Arabic and English.
Initially, Wahed was enthusiastically congenial towards me. Although
his hospitality and friendliness never dwindled, he increasingly adopted
the ‘proper’ Islamic attitude of distance towards women: he no longer
came to sit next to me and avoided eye contact and jocular chit-chat.
In public in particular he hardly acknowledged my presence, initially
apologetically, but increasingly more sternly. In our continuing
conversations about Islam, he increasingly emphasized the centrality of
imān (belief ) and the afterlife. It was not only towards me that his
attitude changed. After another three-day meeting with the TJ, he
entered his home with the formal ‘Salaam Aleikum’ greeting, eliciting a
giggling response from his wife. This formality recreated traditional
gender relations in multiple ways: by injecting appropriate distance in an
intimate relationship, but also enacting equal respect, as the TJ taught
him that men and women are fundamentally equal in God’s eyes. Wahed
lectured Pompa on the Hadith and scolded his father for singing Arabic
verses without knowing their meaning. He became ever more aware of
Islamic aesthetics and whereas Masiruddin would continue to occasionally
wear jeans or a shirt, Wahed only dressed in a white pāñjābi.
Faizul Mondal
Faizul had an altogether different story. He used to be professional
dancer and appeared in music videos. The work required him to go
to Mumbai and Delhi, and other major Indian cities. He kept all
the pictures and even his shiny clothes in a box and, like
Masiruddin, he seemed proud of his previous achievements. He also
used to run a dance school in Barakpur, where he met and fell in
love with his wife Titli, a girl from Farukhbazar who had attended
boarding school in Barakpur.
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Despite the pride he could not hide, he told me he felt he was living
a sinful life. One night when he was back in Joygram, just three
months before I arrived in the village, he had visited the graveyard
(mājār) beside the shrine and the cattle market. An angel had
appeared to him who told him that he should stop living his sinful
life and follow the right path to Allah. So, in Faizul’s case, the
‘miracle of truth’ was indeed a miracle and involved surrendering to
sacred authority.
Faizul immediately gave up the dancing job and moved back to the
small mud house in Joygram he had inherited from his mother. He
started wearing a tụpi (skullcap) at all times, and jocularly introduced
himself to me as ‘tụpioyālā’ (‘the man with the tụpi’) on our ﬁrst
encounter. His disposition and behaviour changed radically over the
next  months. Initially, he did not cease to passionately tell me about
the virtues of Islam and expand on the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad. After his initial four months with the TJ in Delhi,
however, his disposition became increasingly sober and pious, even
though the ﬂicker of passion in his eyes never dwindled. Like Wahed,
his greetings became more solemn and ‘properly’ Islamic. At the same
time, he became more involved in the cattle market, where he had
been doing odd jobs, and he transformed from a jumpy village boy to
a respectable businessman. He remained extremely friendly and
hospitable, and continued to teach me about Islam whenever I visited
him, but there was less of our youthful banter. His ‘uncool’ passion,
inspired by the revelation of the angel, gradually changed into a cool
passion of conviction. Notably, the ‘darkness’ from which Masiruddin
and Faizul emerged was the modernity of globalized culture and
conspicuous consumption which they had come to reject, instead
becoming enveloped in an alternative modernity infused with Islamic
and local moral precepts.
Meanwhile, Titli rapidly grew from an adolescent girl into a pious
adult, who appeared to cherish her purdah like no other woman. She
was very happy Faizul had become a dedicated Muslim. His previous
glamorous cosmopolitan lifestyle had inspired in her a fear that he
would meet other girls but now she felt she could trust him. She
had started a Bachelor’s degree but did not seem to like it or care
much about it. She was happy at home, she said, although she
deeply enjoyed the occasional outings she undertook with the TJ.
Titli was at the forefront of some young Joygrami women who used
Islamic reformist discourse to challenge certain norms that
undermined their freedoms and rights. For instance, they would call
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the norm that women were not allowed to go to the bazaar a ‘cultural’
tradition that men invented to suppress women, as men and women
were supposed to have equal rights in Islam. According to Titli, the
introduction of the niqab was a religious instruction that women
chose to follow because it deepened their personal relationship
with God.20
The Tablighis’ challenge to modernity
These three narratives exemplify the aspiration of reformist Muslims for a
kind of sublime conviction that is highly rationalized and puriﬁed, but that
is equally embodied and mystical: an ‘enchanted modern’ (Deeb ).
The conviction and practice of the reformist Muslims in Joygram
combine modern and anti-modern elements in a radical alternative, in
which the sacred and the emotional, and the rational and the logical
are inseparably bound. Reason is sacred, and the sacred is logical. In
going beyond the stock categories of secular modernity, Islamic
reformism in Joygram heralds an ethical framework for being in the
world that does not correspond to, and cannot be contained within, the
hegemonic ideologies of our time. Much like other highly emotive
social movements within and outside Islam, this nonconformity can
cause considerable perplexity and conﬂict with the representatives of
hegemonic frameworks. But, equally, it can cause scepticism and
tension on the part of those whom the reformers seek to bring into
their fold, and it is to this that I now turn.
Changing aesthetics among Joygrami Tablighis:
performing virtue
One of the most obvious and visible changes that could be observed in
Joygram was the changing aesthetics involved with the ‘conversion’ to
reformist Islam. Here, I discuss how Tablighis performed a modern
20 Cf. Huq (, ) for similar observations among women in Islamist Qur’anic
study groups in Bangladesh. Huq () demonstrates that women also use the lessons
learned to challenge received wisdom. A point of difference is that Titli and Pompa
primarily received lessons orally and were therefore not in a similar position to question
authority on the basis of written text.
FERNANDE W. POOL
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X19000180
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 11 Mar 2020 at 10:01:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
ethical self through their aesthetics, and the scepticism this provoked,
which possibly points to a public perception that ascetic withdrawal
from the world is the ‘end of ethics’ rather than the moral
high ground.
It was quite a sight to see a troop of TJ practitioners process through the
village. They would walk briskly, usually dressed meticulously in long
white pāñjābi and a variety of tụpis (skullcaps), with their upper lips
shaven and their beards waving, as is the prescribed aesthetic of the
Deoband. They would have stern looks on their faces, gazes averted.21
Their appearance was one of cleanliness and aesthetic awareness, and
contrasted starkly with the usual dress of agricultural labourers: a luṅgi
and a vest.22
Several times I found Faizul in his room working on his appearance.
He would iron his kurtā with the utmost care and he would not leave a
single hair on his upper lip. He had brought a waistcoat and a green
scarf from Delhi, and he had a way of wrapping the scarf around his
head that made him look particularly charismatic.23 When I announced
that I would be visiting the TJ’s ‘world market’, as Joygramis called the
headquarters in Delhi, he was quick to ask me to bring him a tụpi as
the one he had bought had discoloured.
Small adjustments to dress may make someone look ‘closer to Islam’ as
one tries to emulate the aesthetics of the Prophet Muhammad. To wear a
speciﬁc ‘scent’, for instance, is sunnā: I had already noticed that madrasa
teachers and Islamic scholars would always carry a minuscule bottle of
scent with them, and it became increasingly popular among the TJ
participants, too.24 Wahed’s sudden and abundant use of scent was the
object of great mockery by his father. The application of black kohl
21 When meeting them in groups, even comprised of those with whom I was close, in the
conﬁnes of their houses, I could not expect more than a stern ‘Salaam Aleikum’, if
I was lucky.
22 A luṅgi is a waistcloth, usually stitched to form a large tube of cloth. Joygrami Muslim
men usually wear a blue checked luṅgi, with a white vest.
23 The turban is reminiscent of a practice at the Deoband madrasa in the early
twentieth century, where the best students would be honoured by having a turban
wrapped around their heads (Metcalf ).
24 The small bottles often have Arabic text on them and are considered better if they are
imported from an Islamic country, preferably Saudi Arabia. Arifuddin, a young madrasa
teacher, asked me whenever I went to Delhi to bring him scent; even though the same
scents were available locally, he considered the brands available in Delhi to be more
properly Islamic. It is fairly uncommon for ordinary villagers to wear any scent, except
for the body spray (deodorant) that is slowly becoming popular among the more
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(kājal) on the lower eyelid is another sunnā. The Prophet prescribed the
application of kohl because it makes the eye-white appear brighter and
the eyesight as strong and clear as an eagle’s. The young men seemed
to be well aware that the black line under their eyes in combination
with the long white dresses made their appearance even more charismatic.
To follow the Sunnah closely sometimes meant compromising on
previous aesthetic preferences. Soon after coming back from a short
tour with the TJ, Wahed suddenly cut his hair, which had curled well
down the back of his head and had closely resembled his father’s
hairstyle. He said it had not been right to wear his hair long, and since
he had learned from the TJ to follow the Prophet’s exemplary
behaviour, he had cut his hair short. I later learned from Samsuddin,
an Islamic scholar, that one’s haircut was a crucial and very precise
matter. It had to be the same length on all sides of the head; for a
young Muslim it should preferably be between one and two centimetres
long. Only an older, learned scholar had the right to wear his hair
long, so Wahed’s hairstyle was not only a failure to obey the Sunnah
closely, but also a sign of vanity and pretension.
Some women also changed their appearance to be ‘close to Islam’,
substituting the sari (now called a Hindu dress) for the salwar kameez
(‘real’ Muslim attire). The women who participated in the TJ, Pompa
and Titli, were at the forefront of making such changes. Pompa
complained to me that having to exchange her nightgown for a salwar
kameez in the morning, and again before prayer at noon, increased the
already heavy burden of laundry, which was done by hand. But apart
from that, both women preferred the more practical salwar kameez
over the sari, and now they could justify this choice by referring to the
ofﬁcial Deobandi discourse, which also stated that it covers the body
better than the sari does. Other young women also mobilized this
discourse to justify their reluctance to wear a sari, although they
admitted to being equally motivated by the increased mobility the
salwar kameez offers: cycling to school and work in a sari is tough.
Following on from the above, I suggest that the aesthetics of the TJ is a
multivocal symbol that can be interpreted and also employed in various
ways, depending on the actor and the audience. First, the ironed white
dress can be a symbol of status as it distinguishes one from the tillers of
the soil. Secondly, the body and these aesthetics of dress can be
‘modern’/urban-inﬂuenced youth. Body spray and scent are considered to be two entirely
different things.
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employed as a technique for cultivating the inner self and revealing its
potentiality (Mahmood : ), since dress has performative force
(Tarlo and Moors ) and is constitutive of the self (Miller ). By
dressing like the Prophet Muhammad, one commits oneself to the
self-discipline involved in behaving like the Prophet. Initially, Wahed
would display a hesitant smile when making use of speciﬁcally Islamic
(and non-Bengali but Urdu or Arabic) terms and gestures (eliciting
a mocking smirk from his wife). Over the course of my ﬁeldwork,
however, he gained conﬁdence and lost his initial insecure hesitation;
he seemed to have internalized the values that were initially
exterior performances.
Mahmood’s () interpretation of the exterior performance as a
means to transform the interior self applies to some Tablighis, but it is
not the entire explanation. So, ﬁnally, the public performance of piety
and authenticity itself can be the end of aesthetics. I found resonance
with Grosso’s (: ) observation that ‘in Tunis, performance [of
ethical personhood] appears to be oriented towards cultivating social
relationships and towards maintaining the impression of morality in an
atmosphere marked by the fear of moral breakdown’, an analysis that is
particularly appropriate for Masiruddin.
Although many aspects of Masiruddin’s lifestyle changed, he continued
to do the same work and for this, being a Tablighi has almost become
a useful asset to him. This was especially so in the contractor business,
which was commonly assumed to be corrupt: contractors were viewed
as immoral, greedy people out to ﬁll their own pockets. Being a
businessman and contractor who walked around in sunglasses and
transparent shirts would have made it very easy for others to consider
him to be badmāś. It was much better for his social status, and as such
for his economic opportunities, to look like a dedicated Muslim. His
aesthetics almost seemed to give him an a priori protection from
critique. Hardly anyone dared to openly talk to me about business or
would do so with an apologetic expression on their faces. Masiruddin,
instead, jocularly expounded on the shady aspects of obtaining a tender,
adding self-evidently, ‘well, that’s how business goes’ (etạ̄ to byab’sā).
He was himself critical of the corrupt political and economic
environment, but he admitted that being drawn into it was inescapable.
So, while going about business as usual, his participation in the TJ gave
him a sense of dignity and respect, while performing respectability in
the public eye. Masiruddin seemed to be aware of the performativity of
his aesthetics: he would sometimes greet me with a ﬂat hand by his face
(a ‘proper’ Islamic greeting but locally a very unusual gesture) but could
THE TABL IGHI JAMAAT IN WEST BENGAL 
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X19000180
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 11 Mar 2020 at 10:01:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
never avoid a self-mocking smile. That is not to deny the sincerity of his
commitment; he did actively try to cultivate a virtuous character.
However, his aesthetics also allowed him to partake in capitalist
practices with moral pretence, reminiscent of Weberian Protestants.
For Joygrami Tablighis and devout Deobandis, the ‘public’ comprises
the Muslims in the village, among whom one acts as an exemplary
ﬁgure, as well as other Muslims and non-Muslims in the wider public
sphere. The public performance in turn impacts on self-cultivation: now
one has to act according to the criteria the performance establishes.
The performance, however, is not always convincing.
The ascetics of the renouncer and the sincerity of
the householder
The sincerity of the Tablighis and devout Deobandis in Joygram was
questioned: tropes of irony and mockery were very common in
Joygram, and the Tablighis were not spared. The Tablighi’s attitude
was considered by some to be condescending and pretentious, with too
much importance attributed to aesthetic performance rather than to an
actual Islamic lifestyle. It was somewhat common to refer to the
supposedly pious ones as nāmājīs (roughly translatable as ‘those who
pray a lot’) or as dār ̣ioyālā or tụpioyālā (‘he who wears a beard’, ‘he who
wears a tụpi’, with sarcastic undertones). Raﬁq, who claimed to be a
committed Muslim but did not seem to ﬁnd it at all problematic that
he occasionally drank alcohol, met girls, and was involved in various
dubious businesses, one day said to me: ‘Those … nāmājīs … many just
show off … they don’t do it sincerely. Does anyone really pray?
Nobody does.’ With undisguised sarcasm he commented on the
transformation of the boss of the cattle market after his hajj to Mecca:
everyone knew he was a corrupt exploiter, ‘but now he has become
good … tụpi, beard…’. I exclaimed in feigned surprise: ‘So those who
go on Haj and wear tụpis and beards are the ones who are most
badmāś!’ He laughed, nodding his head, ‘yes, now you got it…’.
Hussain was also critical about TJ participants being ‘very nāmājī ’: those
who are pious ‘show off’ (dekhānor janya) yet fail to apply the lessons of Islam
in everyday life. The small house belonging to Hussain’s family was right
next to Wahed’s house, and one day one of Wahed’s regular labourers
came to Hussain crying. He had been working all day for Wahed, but
he had not been given any food, not even a cup of tea, he complained.
I overheard Hussain grumbling, ‘he is working with the [Tablighi]
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Jamaat, but in his own house he doesn’t care for people’. It may well have
been that Wahed had been punishing the labourer on that day, as he was
obviously very drunk. Nevertheless, Hussain immediately took the
opportunity to see an incongruity between the public performance of
piety and the lack of actual virtuous behaviour.
Curiously, Wahed was more often the object of scepticism than
Masiruddin. Many Joygramis considered Wahed to be somewhat good,
considering his Islamic lifestyle and appearance, but his sincerity in his
relations to other villagers was doubted. Masiruddin was considered
‘good in every aspect’. The differences between the brothers are
reminiscent of the ‘householder’s dilemma’ (see, for example, Burghart
; Laidlaw ; Madan ). Householders are inevitably
embroiled in sinful worldly activities to ensure their survival, so it is
impossible to attain the goal of moral perfection. A renouncer dedicates
his or her life to the sublime Truth and is considered closer to
salvation. Both Wahed and Masiruddin were caught in an ‘inner
conﬂict’ (Parry : ) of how to balance religious conviction with
the demands of everyday life, but Wahed was closer to the path of the
renouncer whereas Masiruddin was closer to that of the householder.
The Joygramis’ scepticism points to a recognition of the limits of ethics in
everyday life. This is what Das () has called ‘the difﬁculty of reality’. Most
Tablighis, not unlike the Jains described by Laidlaw (), would admit that
the goal of emulating the Prophet’s exemplary behaviour was impossible,
and that they themselves were only ‘more or less good Muslims’ (motạ̄mōti
bhālo Muslim). In the villagers’ praise for Masiruddin and scorn of Wahed,
there seems to be a recognition that the moral predicament of the
householder is more difﬁcult than the renouncer’s and hence more
praiseworthy: ‘that it is not because the renouncer’s otherworldly
aspirations are impossible for the householder to follow (they are), but that
it is inhabiting the world, sustaining it, that is seen as the ethically much
more difﬁcult task’ (Das : –). The Joygramis’ complaints call
into question the value of the modern performance of piety and is a
reminder that one is ultimately not the liberated individual of the modern
narrative but intimately tied to various social institutions, for better or worse.
Challenges to village ethics: withdrawal from exchange
Many young men and women in Joygram were drawn to the TJ in an
attempt to recover their autonomy and dignity in the face of
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politico-economic marginalization. However, in reacting against the
unethical practices in their environment, they also gained autonomy
from the bio-moral exchanges in the village. Therefore, the puriﬁcation
of Islam from un-Islamic elements has far-reaching consequences for
ethical practice. In this section, I examine how even though Joygrami
virtue ethics could encapsulate an ethics of conviction to a certain
extent, problems and resistance arose when convictions changed the
proscriptive ideal of a virtuous person. This was the case when
convictions made one turn away from everyday responsibilities to one’s
neighbours and kin, which entailed a withdrawal from the virtuous
exchanges that reproduced the ideals of dharma. I consider these
instances of ‘extra-ordinary ethics’.
The practice that reformist Islam agitated against most was shirk
(religious mediation), including the worship of saints in shrines.
Masiruddin and Wahed rejected their father’s practice of mediation,
and they instructed him that even though he could still welcome and
advise both Hindus and Muslims at the shrine, he could no longer
guarantee them the efﬁcacy of his power (as the power is with Allah)
and he was no longer allowed to accept money for his services.
Masiruddin explained the disapproval of shirk as follows: ‘Islam is like a
complete system, like when rain falls and it evaporates and goes back to
the sky to materialize in rain again. So, you can only directly worship
Allah, not via a mediator.’
The shrine was moreover the central locus of a traditional system of
patronage involving several celebrations the TJ opposes. The most
signiﬁcant was the celebration of Muharram.25 Deobandi Islam
prescribed that Muslims should fast for two days on this auspicious day,
as opposed to the traditional ﬁghting with bamboo sticks,
self-ﬂagellation, and processions involving music and dance. The
Khadims, most of whom were explicitly Deobandi and considered
themselves to be more reformed, educated, and civilized, opposed the
traditional celebration but grudgingly admitted that ‘it has to be done
because of the market’. In their capacity as caretakers (musualis) of the
WAQF property, they had to invest a part of the proﬁts in the
25 Muharram is technically the ﬁrst month of the Islamic calendar, but in common
speech refers to the tenth day of this month. On this day, the Day of Ashura, Shia
Muslims typically mourn over and replicate the sufferings of Hussain ibn Ali; Sunni
Muslims usually fast in commemoration of Moses’ victory over the Eqyptian pharaoh.
The Muslims in my ﬁeldsite are all Sunni, but the practice of Islam in West Bengal has
historically included Shia as well as Sunni practices.
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celebration and provide the (blessed) food, musicians, and medical
assistance. They feared that if they did not continue this form of
patronage, the ‘public’—the poor, ‘uncivilized’, and ‘unreformed’
Muslims in the village—would protest. Indeed, Joygramis from other
hamlets who participated in the celebrations greatly enjoyed it and
steadfastly maintained that they would not let the Khadims stop their
stick ﬁghts. They attached signiﬁcance to these ﬁghts because it was a
tradition, a skill passed on from father to son for generations. It was just
fun, not a matter of Islamic doctrine. Some did acknowledge that (in
particular) the alcohol abuse involved was a deviation from dharma,
but they considered this as an eccentricity that did not hamper their
aspirations to be good Muslims or even modern subjects. For Wahed,
on the contrary, it was a crucial matter of dharma. He was particularly
upset about the sacrilegious practices and refused to contribute his
share—which in turn incurred the wrath of the other Khadims. As a
result of the objectiﬁcation process typical of piety movements
(Hirschkind ; Mahmood ; Keane : ff ), Wahed
embodied a new kind of agency and personal responsibility towards the
Muslim ummah (community) as a whole, rather than to his immediate kin.
Besides shirk, any practices deemed Hindu were resolutely rejected. One of
the most consequential acts was the rejection of dowry, as its exchange was
fully integrated in village life. Customarily, the girl’s family would pay a
dowry to the groom’s family, a tradition that had grown out of proportion,
with lakhs of rupees (thousands of pounds), fridges, and bicycles being
demanded from the new in-laws. Islamic law, however, opposes this
practice, so the reformist Deobandis argued against it, calling it a ‘bad
Hindu inﬂuence’. Hickel () has observed that the interruption of these
kinds of life-cycle rituals is particularly liable to create a cultural backlash
(cf. Keane : –). What is remarkable here is that the backlash
was not against the interventions of a modern state seeking to civilize its
citizens but against the Tablighis. This observation positions the TJ ﬁrmly
as a catalyst of an alternative modernization that would run parallel to any
modernization efforts of the state. Below, I recount in detail a conﬂict that
occurred due to the withdrawal from a dowry exchange.
Ethical interruption: a ‘Jamaat’ wedding
On a fateful day during the month of Ramadan, Rahaman Saheb, the
most authoritative Islamic scholar in Joygram, was sitting with his sons
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on the roadside, when their neighbours Kairul and his sisters and mother
came up to them and started shouting abusive words (gālāgāl), even calling
Rahaman Saheb a pig’s son. This infuriated his sons who retaliated with
physical violence. It was a shocking event: as madrasa teachers and imams,
Rahaman Saheb’s sons were supposed to be exemplars of pious
behaviour. The conﬂict revolved around the marriage of Kairul’s
brother Azizul but was fundamentally about the reformist withdrawal
from customary exchanges.
Azizul was a devout TJ participant and as such was very close to the
sons of Rahaman Saheb who occasionally joined the TJ. Azizul
married a girl against his mother’s wishes (she opposed the marriage
because the girl’s family was very poor). So, while his mother was
hoping Azizul would marry a wealthier girl and she would earn two
lakhs by virtue of having a son, Azizul followed Islamic rule and
married the girl he had fallen in love with, without any money being
exchanged. The wedding had been small and sober, a proper Islamic
wedding, Jāmāter biye as they would say.26 It had taken place only at
the girl’s house and not at both households, as is traditionally the case,
and no food was distributed in the relevant neighbourhoods.
Azizul’s family’s fury was directed at Rahaman Saheb’s family because
Nasiruddin (Rahaman Saheb’s eldest son) had taken Azizul to meet the
girl. In addition, imam Jamiruddin (Rahaman Saheb’s second eldest
son) had married the couple, but, Jamiruddin claimed, only after it was
uniformly approved during a local meeting of the TJ.
Mediated by Basir Khadim in his capacity as representative of the
political party in power, the two families eventually reconciled. They
remained mutually hostile for the remainder of my ﬁeldwork, however,
and Kairul’s anger did not wane. Months later, I prompted him to tell
me why he and his mother had been so upset with the marriage. First,
he said, ‘my mom didn’t even see her face! And how can he choose a
wife my mom hasn’t even seen yet!’ Then he pointed to the shack
behind us: ‘Their house is like that. They can’t offer their guests
anything, not even a place to sit, not even a tea. They can’t offer any
respect.’ Then, of course, there was the dowry. Already, he explained,
Azizul had gotten in trouble. His afﬁnes had urged the couple to leave
the house, because they did not have the means to sustain them.
Azizul’s wife was pregnant but Azizul had hardly any income—he
26 Biye means ‘wedding’ and jāmāter refers to the Tablighi Jamaat, which in fact means it
is a wedding according to the prescripts of the Deoband school of thought.
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worked occasionally at the cattle market—and was not able to provide his
wife and baby with either a house or food.
If he would have gotten a dowry, he could have started a small business, invest the
money somehow and have a regular income. But he didn’t think about it, that
when you need  rupees to feed one person, you need  for two people
and  for three people. Think of the price of tomatoes,  kg, or potatoes,
 kg, there are so many costs involved in feeding a family. But now he
realizes, now he has come back home because he isn’t fed there, and he walks
in like a dog with his tail in between his legs, eats, and walks out like a dog again.
Kairul displayed a sinister smile. ‘And they [Rahaman Saheb’s family] will
also understand that they made a mistake, that you shouldn’t create
trouble in other people’s family. Now that Azizul is in big trouble, they
will all realize; they made a mistake.’
‘Extra-ordinary ethics’: changes in personhood
and relatedness
An analysis of the tension between villagers and relatives as an example of
‘extra-ordinary ethics’ reveals deeper currents of change more than
exclusive attention to pragmatic motivations would do. The withdrawal
from traditional exchange practices could be interpreted as a move
towards an individualistic economy disembedded from local exchanges.
In particular, changes in life-cycle rituals may signify a new kind of
individual freedom, exempt from the demands and costs of traditional
exchange relationships (Horstmann ; Janson ) and expensive
patronage such as is expected on the festival of Muharram. The TJ’s
ofﬁcial doctrine condemns the materialism they associate with Western
modernity and opposes conspicuous consumption (cf. Masud b:
xxix), but reformist Islam does not condemn material pursuits per se,
and individual TJ participants may ﬁnd ways to combine piety
with prosperity. Individual prosperity may be included in a broader
ethical narrative: among reformist Muslims elsewhere economic success
can be considered a virtuous act that is part of the production of the
‘proper’ Muslim (Osella and Osella ; Rudnyckyj ), similar to
some expressions of revitalized and charismatic Christianity (Coleman
; Comaroff ). The rejection of the dowry in particular may
also be an instance of enacting male virtue and male supremacy.
Azizul embodied a new kind of modern, virtuous masculinity—not
unreﬂexively following habitual practices but enacting personal
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responsibility, agency, and choice, and answerable to the virtuous Muslim
community (embodied in the local TJ meeting) rather than to kin.
Moreover, most villagers were aware that dowry practices were no longer
legally allowed. By rejecting the dowry in a TJ meeting, Azizul and the
others involved may have been appropriating a secular legal ruling
(possibly demanded by secular feminists) as a TJ ruling enacted by
modern, Islamic, and virtuous males.
I do not want to romanticize the motivations for change or underplay the
pragmatism involved. It may be true that for some of the wealthier
participants in Joygram, reformist Islam offered a ‘social framework that
legitimises the pursuit of individualised lifestyles’ (Janson : ) and
enabled displays of male virtuosity. However, whether as explicit
motivation or an implicit consequence, there were more complex
ethical transitions.
For many Joygramis, it was a sense of moral failure that impelled them
to cultivate piety. Yet they were not sure how to combine this with
everyday demands, which brings me again to the householder’s
dilemma. Some Tablighis and devout Deobandis aimed for a level of
Salvationist asceticism, and the seasonal and annual travels of the
Tablighis offered them a space for temporary renunciation (cf. Masud
b: xviii). However, at home they could not entirely escape ‘the
social world of interdependence and relationships of exchange’ (Parry
: ). Kairul made it very clear that Azizul had disregarded not
only his mother’s authority, but also the normative relationships of
exchange.27 In his account of the story, Kairul sounded very pragmatic:
the disregard of the ways in which material or monetary goods and
services were customarily exchanged risked the survival and
reproduction of the household. Azizul himself, and the Tablighis who
supported him, may have been closer to salvation in their renunciation
of ‘the social world of interdependence’, but they put Azizul’s mother
in a situation where survival rather than salvation was the main worry.
In this light, Azizul could be considered selﬁsh and individualistic.
However, the seemingly disproportionate outrage of Kairul’s family
points to a deeper issue which comes closer to Parry’s observation that
‘salvation turns its back on society and disregards its basic axioms’
27 The dowry is not a timeless practice of exchange: oral history tells that in
pre-partition, Muslim- majority Bengal there was a variety of practices, including bride’s
price (as practised in predominantly Islamic places such as Khasmir, according to my
participants) or no dowry.
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(Parry : ). Joygrami Muslims embraced a type of ethics that is best
understood as a virtue ethics, one that was visceral rather than interiorized
and was strongly related to the local ethics of bio-moral exchange. The
‘good human person’ is morally and physically generated from
exchange relationships with the creator-god and social networks. The
goal of virtue ethics is ideally not an abstract utopia (as is the case with
an ethics of conviction). Reciprocal exchange itself is the source of
well-being and productiveness (cf. Parry : ) and, as such, the
enactment of virtue and the ‘art of life’—living ethically for the sake of it,
which implies the transcendence of instrumentality (Lambek : ).
The withdrawal from reciprocal exchange is an act of disregard for the
cosmopolitics of bio-moral exchange and therefore threatens the social
regeneration of ethical persons. Without the customary exchange of food
in the village, the bride was not incorporated within the network of social
relatedness, which is essential for sustaining order, dharma.
Reformism is by implication a reconﬁguration of what is considered
virtuous. If dharma is the potential of an ethics of order and justice,
then reformism not only re-establishes order but also reconﬁgures how
the potential for order and justice can be realized. It centralizes a
different kind of person, one who is generated by the individual pursuit
of ethical transformation embedded in the larger Islamic ummah rather
than through interactions within local and kin relatedness. Whereas the
‘monadic modern person’ and the ‘discontinuous personage’ (Lambek
) were both already valid constructs in Joygrami cosmopolitics, the
relative salience was shifting in favour of the continuous modern person.
In the process of objectiﬁcation, rationalization, and individualization,
the ideology of the discontinuous, protean person was losing
signiﬁcance. Even though salvation was possibly more important for the
reformists, they did not neglect this-worldly virtue. However, the locus
of virtue became the individual and the Islamic ummah rather than
relatedness within the village. As in other expressions of a modern
ethics of conviction, ‘being ethically good and sincere in one’s care for
the “neighbour” [was] in this view of no real consequence if not
embedded in a larger vision of transformation’ (Hansen : ). In
their desire to transform their society into a properly Islamic one, and
in their yearning for salvation, Azizul, Nasiruddin, and Jamiruddin
disregarded their care for their relationships within the village, just as
Wahed disregarded both the people of other hamlets who were denied
his contribution to Muharram and solidarity with the other Khadims.
The Tablighis were mainly opposed to practices that might have been
inﬂuenced by Hinduism, even when some, strictly speaking, might have
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had nothing to do with Hinduism but were called ‘Hindu’ because the
prevalent culture is associated with the dominant majority. They would
usually give an extended justiﬁcation as to why this ‘Hindu’ practice was
not virtuous, whereas the Islamic practice was virtuous, with reference to
science or to the ways in which traditional practices are inappropriate in
current social and economic conditions. The reformists would say that
they preferred a small and inexpensive, one-day Islamic wedding as
opposed to several days of reciprocal meals and celebrations which the
villagers simply could not afford, and that they opposed the dowry
because it is exploitative.
In this light, the TJ in Joygram not (only) opposed practices because
they had a different conception of virtue, but (also) because those
practices were actually—upon reﬂection—no longer considered virtuous
within their own ideological frame. Ideally, reciprocal exchanges would
take place between equals—perhaps not equals in wealth and power
but certainly in dignity and fundamental human value. There was an
implicit recognition among the reformist Muslims that the staggering
inequality in wealth and power within Joygram was eroding the
equality between people and that the exchanges had become
instrumentalized and disembedded from dharma. Material inequality is
not necessarily problematic per se, but it is if it erodes the principle of
equal human dignity. This was very clear in the case of Muharram. As
the power of Abu Bakr as a spiritual leader was slowly eroding, Haji
Saheb, the boss of the cattle market, and the other shareholders were
increasingly taking charge of ritual patronage.28 The result was an
increasingly instrumentalized patronage, depleted of spiritual meaning,
and deeply corrupted at that. Everyone in Joygram was aware that the
shareholders kept a double account and that most of the proﬁts that on
paper were set aside for ‘charitable funds’ would disappear directly into
the shareholders’ pockets.29 What the reformists aimed to instantiate
once again was the central Islamic principle of equality. And they did
so particularly in instances where modern institutions (particularly the
capitalist market) had corrupted the nature of those exchange to the
extent that they no longer represented the ethics they were supposed to
perform: Islamic values of equality and solidarity. In attempting to
28 Abu Bakr had fought a -year court case with Haji Saheb over who was the
designated caretaker (musuali) of the WAQF property. He lost, and only retained the
rights over the shrine and a small part of the cattle market.
29 The musualis had to provide ofﬁcial accounts to the State WAQF board. They did not
have to pay tax on the proﬁts set aside for charity funds.
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transform those practices, Tablighis were re-establishing the Islamic value
of equality, but now between autonomous individuals, at the expense of
the customary regeneration of persons through exchange.
The irony is that when exchange is not between equals, some can opt out
whereas others are dependent on it. The rich were more likely to be
Deobandi and to refuse to engage in exchange practices. Azizul was not at
all wealthy and could not afford to be independent of exchange
relationships. For this reason, I suggest, Kairul was deeply upset about the
fate of his brother: he made a mistake that may prove to have
grave consequences.
In light of this analysis, the violent conﬂict over Azizul’s wedding (as well
as the fear of conﬂict over the end of Muharram) was an instance of
‘extra-ordinary ethics’:
[T]he ‘ordinary’ implies an ethics that is relatively tacit, grounded in agreement
rather than rule, in practice rather than knowledge or belief, and happening
without calling undue attention to itself. When, by contrast, ethics does
become explicit, that is generally () in respect to its breaches; () with regard
to ethical problems or issues in which the right thing to do is unknown or
hotly contested; () in prophetic movements and social or ethical renewal; and
() among priestly classes attempting to rationalize and educate (Lambek : ).
In this case, the right thing to do was hotly contested, because of a
movement of ethical renewal that was attempting to rationalize
uneducated Muslims. In a time of conversion, ethical transformation, or
ethical breach—those moments when ethics become explicit—the
contradictions and compromises with which one lives—and always have
and always will—come to the surface (Engelke ; Janson ;
Robbins ). That is, I am not arguing that reformism is an invasion
in a coherent cultural system (see Osella and Osella ) or a
complete ‘break with the past’ (see Meyer ). At this moment of
‘extra-ordinary ethics’, the reformists continued to act within a virtue
ethics of order and justice, but they did not attach the same signiﬁcance
to social exchanges. And this heralded the transition to a different way
of being in the world, less embedded in local community, and both
more modern and more anti-modern in outlook.
Seeking civility and inclusion through culture
As is clear from his narrative, Masiruddin had a strong desire to ‘uplift’ his
community. Being a ‘bad Muslim’ was tightly bound up with the idea that
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Muslims lacked adequate ‘culture’ (used in English). In the view of the
reformists, improving culture by becoming a better Muslim should make
them more likely to be included in the Indian nation-state. The
Tablighis wanted to show, through their aesthetic performance and
virtuous conduct, particularly in an atmosphere of suspicion, that
Muslims were peaceful, generous, and modest. However, their Islamic
aesthetics further classiﬁed them as Other, not indigenous to Indian soil.
Muslims were acutely aware that they had to cultivate themselves as a
particular kind of modern Muslim citizen in order to make demands on
the state. The pervasive idea is that one has to make oneself an asset to
the nation and live lawfully before one can gain this recognition.
Deobandi-trained imams or TJ members indirectly encompassed Indian
law in the Islamic normativity as they would profess that it would be a
sin to not obey Indian law, and disobedience of the law would have
consequences for the afterlife.30
The reformists’ aspiration for modern subjectivity did not imply a
wholesale co-opting of the modernity of the state. Their tactics were
partly pragmatic, to gain not only dignity and respect, but also access to
state services and employment, and protection against (violent)
discrimination. Relegated to the margins of the nation-state, they had to
constantly reassert their allegiance. Williams () found that in
Varanasi, Muslims actively engaged with the rhetoric of secularism
because it offered spaces of recognition and participation in the face of
majoritarian discriminatory practices. In Joygram, as in Varanasi, ‘being
a ‘good Muslim’ and a ‘good Indian citizen’ went hand in hand and it
was ‘by emphasising the latter that [Muslims sought] to realise justice
and the public recognition of the former … Muslim citizenship is
negotiated through a particular way of being in society that reﬂects
forms of civility, connection and inclusion’ (ibid.: –).
In Joygram, the idiom used to encompass modern civility as well as
Islamic moral righteousness was often the all-encompassing concept of
culture, which was locally infused with Islamic connotations. Islamic
reformism became a salient vehicle through which to cultivate the
rational, reﬂexive subjectivity that allowed for the inclusion of Muslims
in the civilized citizenry. Education was considered crucial for learning
30 A mufti (Islamic legal scholar) at the Deoband madrasa I spoke to at the TJ
headquarters in Delhi conﬁrmed that ‘it is a sin not to obey the law of the country where a
Muslim lives’. Even travelling on a bus without a ticket is a great sin (Urdu guna) and
would cost ‘forty days good work’ in the accounting system for the afterlife.
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culture, and for Muslims inspired by reformism, Islamic education in
particular would cultivate culture, which included the inculcation of
civility. In other words, the ‘way of being’ that reﬂects civility was
Islamic; for this reason, a government madrasa or a mission school was
a vehicle through which to embed a culture that was considered not
fundamentally different to the culture inculcated in the Indian citizenry
by national leaders. Similarly, the rhetoric around the mission schools
focused on the idea of ‘good culture’ (bhālo culture) in the ambition to
include Muslims in the (respectable) Indian citizenry.
The idea that culture provides the moral backbone to the project of
the Indian nation-state is, at ﬁrst glance, a seamless reproduction of the
‘anti-politics discourse’ (Hansen , ) which is rooted in the
paradox of Indian secularism. In India, the secular polity is premised
on religious pluralism rather than absence of religion and entails the
creation and management of discrete pre-political religious communities
by a supposedly neutral and ‘enlightened’ state whose very legitimacy is
derived from their control of the potentially dangerous ‘masses’.31
Meanwhile, moral projects are the responsibility of these religious
communities, which supposedly remain unspoiled by politics and the
economy. The communities, indeed, have to foster ‘good culture’.
However, the idiom of culture, when employed by my interlocutors, was
infused with not only Islamic content but also with aspirations for modern
personhood and had the connotation of infusing the morally corrupted
domains of politics and the economy with cultured, ethical content. That
is, ‘culture’ in the anti-political discourse has a different meaning from
culture in the Joygrami discourse. The paradoxes of the Muharram
celebrations highlight the problem of this disjunction.
The State WAQF Board was one of the institutions that continued the
post-colonial policy of anti-politics, as it was based on the assumption that
Indian Muslims formed a static, coherent, and unpolitical cultural
community (Hansen : ). Through such institutions, as well as
through state-funded ‘secular’ madrasas, the responsibility to ‘control’
the ‘irrational masses’ was delegated to the civilized leaders of the
community. Although Muharram may have been hollowed out of
31 For a more nuanced and complex rendering of the secularism of the Indian state, see
Pool . At the time of writing () Hindu-nationalist politics seems to be increasingly
hollowing out the secularism of the Indian polity. This analysis is still relevant, in my view,
if in an exacerbated form, as the ‘enlightened’ state increasingly obviously co-opts the
moral project of the supposedly unspoiled Hindu community and still gains legitimacy
from controlling the dangerous (Muslim) masses.
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spiritual meaning and become a means of proﬁtable tax avoidance and a
display of power inequality, on the surface it looked like the timeless
celebration of Indian syncretic culture.
Through such institutions, Muslims were ‘thrown back’ into a
supposedly uniﬁed, ‘elevated unpolitical cultural community based on
the values of the Koran, Hadith and the Personal Law’ (Hansen :
). The irony of Muharram was that it was Indian law that inevitably
drew the shareholders of the cattle market back into the practice of
‘traditional’ ritual patronage. The other villagers participated in the
celebrations because it was ‘fun’, not because of its religious value, and
it came to signify an aberration in their aspirations for good culture and a
civilized, reformed lifestyle.
The complexity of the Muharram celebrations demonstrates that in
reality there never was a negotiation ‘between reiﬁed cultural
communities with fully formed notions of morality and public ethics
and a state driven by “reason”’ (Hansen : ). I want to highlight
two points in this regard. First, culture is not static, reiﬁed, and
community-bound; for my interlocutors the concept implied both
modern, passionate convictions as well as socially generated, embodied
ethics. Secondly, good culture became a vehicle for demands to be
included in the civilized citizenry. Improving culture meant civilizing and
governing oneself ‘in morality as well as law … as beﬁts the citizen of a
secular, liberal society’ (Asad : ). So, whereas Hansen (:
) argues that the TJ, like other cultural-religious organizations, is
ultimately inward looking and informed by ‘anti-political notions of
puriﬁcation of the community’, I suggest that it could equally function
as a vehicle for the outward-looking aspiration to cultivate modern
civility, but with the anti-modern propensities of social relatedness and
holistic ethical ambitions. Joygramis felt that current politics was run by
uncultured ‘animals’ (perhaps the ideal ‘free individual’ of modern
liberalism but lacking in social responsibility) and needed to be restored
with culture-embedded dharma.32 In Joygram, the TJ became a form of
‘anti-politics’ that reproduced the bifurcated framework of ‘dirty’ politics
and ‘clean’ Islam. Its message was more introspective than the
passionate convictions described by Hansen () and Comaroff ()
because of its limited space of navigation, but that was not the
32 As such, they are remarkably similar to the anti-liberal South African migrants Hickel
(: ) talks about, and to many other right-wing and religious social movements
reacting against cultural globalization (Meyer and Geschiere ).
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motivation for most of the (rural) participants; in fact, it curtailed their
intentions for holistic renewal.
Dharma is not an internally static, primordial element of sociality but
changes with the demands of modern life. The vernacularization of
modern categories impinged on new understandings of dharma,
namely, as religion in the narrow sense. Dharma can denote an ethics
of justice and order that is not limited to an explicitly religious
normativity. Good politics, rooted in dharma, does not necessarily
mean Islamic politics. Even if it transpired from conversations that, for
my interlocutors, dharma could mean an ethics of justice in a much
broader sense, these synthesized discourses were aesthetically,
rhetorically, and practically shaped according to an Islamic reformist
discourse because Joygramis had also vernacularized the idea of
dharma-as-religion. In fact, Islamic reformism in Joygram is an
inherently ambiguous response to the modern categorization and
objectiﬁcation of dharma as ‘religion’. It is a non-political, rationalized,
and individualized expression of dharma that contains the potential for
holistic ethical renewal by making Islam a ‘total way of life’ that ﬁts
within the global Islamic reformist agenda. The desire to imbue all
spheres of life—political and economic, public and private—with
ethical content, starting with individual self-fashioning, was absolutely
central to the Tablighis’ project in Joygram. So while modern
categorization might relegate religion to the private sphere, the
comprehensive project of pious self-cultivation renders the private both
sacred and political, giving religion a new, comprehensive meaning.33
This project did not imply disregard of all secular liberal values
(it incorporates many of those values), but did imply protesting against
the idea that there can be morally neutral social domains, because
experience had proven its drawbacks. Moreover, in Joygram, secularism,
both the English term and the vernacular dharmaniropeksạtā, was not
understood in opposition to religion or dharma, but as the principle of
non-discrimination as well as harmonious coexistence. Citizens and
politicians were expected to derive their ethical potential from dharma,
including the propensity for peaceful pluralism.
33 Compare with White’s (: ) observation, on the basis of research undertaken
with Muslims and Hindus in Bangladesh, that ‘just as modernization reassigns religion to
the personal sphere, so it also constitutes “the personal” as a primary arena of governance,
discipline, and satisfaction’ so that what appears ‘to be the marginalization of religion, thus
brings with it simultaneously a re-discovery of and re-emphasis upon it’.
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Post-secular Islamic reformism?
Metcalf () has suggested that the Tablighi, living his everyday life
in society, can be constructed as secular because of the private,
interiorized, and individualized character of his religious practice. The
TJ, because of what is perceived as its political ‘quietism’, may indeed
‘mesh’ better in secular polities, such as South Africa (Moosa : ;
cf. Kepel ), European countries, and India, than other explicitly
political Islamic organizations. Yet, I think that the situation is not only
more complicated, but also that calling the TJ ‘secular’ or even apolitical
is problematic as this is a normative statement that already assumes
different domains in society. Therefore, this categorization fails to
capture the complexity of the motivations and experiences of Joygrami
Tablighis, who were informed both by a speciﬁc local cosmopolitics that
deﬁed such a separation of domains, as well as by globally circulating
ideals. Although I have so far called my interlocutors both modern and
anti-modern, they are perhaps better called post-secular or post-liberal34
in that they were familiar with modern secular and liberal ideologies but
went beyond them in their motivations and aspirations. Reformist Islam
should not be misunderstood as pre-modern, anti-secular, or secular
because it encompasses those ideologies in vernacularized forms on the
basis of a different ideal conception of society. The practices of the TJ in
Joygram challenged an ordering of modern society into sacred and
secular spaces, with secular politics and a market economy disembedded
from the moral realm. The paradoxical tension that remains is not
exclusive to the TJ in Joygram, but may be germane to piety movements
elsewhere, because, as Keane (: ) observes, ‘the totalising pressure
towards the full integration of pious personhood appears to stem, in part,
from the very distinction between religion and nonreligion it seeks
to overcome’.
Moreover, Islamic-inspired aesthetics and culture may not increase their
access to a public sphere increasingly dominated by the Hindu majority.
The traditional Islamic scholars in Joygram, already used to a
suspicious gaze, were aware of the marginalization—rather than
respect—that the carefully groomed aesthetic subjectivity of the
reformists would bring them: ‘the rule of the government is: don’t
give anything to the ones with tụpis and beards’ (sarkārer ‘rule’ hacche:
tụpi- dār ̣i-oyālāke kichu nā dite).
34 See Milbank and Pabst () on post-liberalism.
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Conclusion
Joygrami Muslims were caught in various irreconcilable oppositions: the
educated bhadralok versus the uneducated Muslim; the indigenous
Hindu versus the disloyal Muslim; the pious (Arabic) Muslim versus the
wicked (Bengali) Muslim; and the ascetic, civilized, and rational Muslim
Joygrami versus the poor, uncivilized, and ‘stupid’ Muslim Joygrami. The
cultivation of a pious self could only overcome some of these oppositions
and would reproduce other oppositions. Moreover, the various forms of
marginalization had become inherent to racialized and (de-)moralized
identiﬁcations. Even if the politico-economic and social marginalization
could not be undone that easily, the practice of self-renewal itself
recovered a sense of dignity and self-worth. The sense of marginalization
and the involvement with morally degrading political and economic
practices had detached Muslims from their moral dignity and ethical
autonomy. The TJ offered the opportunity for the personal construction
of an ethical narrative. All Muslims, and not only those who have access
to the bhadralok spaces of education and ‘civilization’, had the potential
to reform and to transcend above their older ‘inferior’ self.
The growing popularity of the Tablighi Jamaat in Joygram marked a
moment of intense cultural, political, and moral transition and
contestation. It has been my intention to embed Islamic reformism in
the political economy in which it is situated, to avoid an exoticizing and
essentializing interpretation of this historical transition as a narrow
religious change, somehow outside the modern world. A presentation of
the Tablighi Jamaat as it was practised, performed, and talked about
shows the complexity of this moral project, which deﬁes being
simplistically categorized as within or against pre-modernity.
The difﬁculty of categorization is obvious in the ambivalent ways in
which Tablighis interacted with traditional patronage between the nearby
hamlets and reciprocal exchange between households, seeking to
transform while nonetheless becoming embroiled in these exchanges.
Although the Tablighis’ practices incited a backlash against their
performance of a modern mode of being, their actions also reﬂected a
discontent with the ways in which modernity had already corrupted
customary exchange. Other studies have pointed out that the alternative
modes of being in the world that Islamic reformism introduces has
locally salient political effects, contesting intergenerational (Janson ),
gendered (Amrullah ; Jasani ; Nisa ), and class power
structures (Sikand ). This article demonstrates, ﬁrst, that contestations
do not remain superﬁcially political but rather have a deep impact on
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very fundamental questions of righteous living, and I therefore call these
instances of ‘extra-ordinary ethics’. Secondly, the changes do not only
move from the traditional to the modern but also against the modern
towards a different ideal society. This observation emphasizes the
complexity of people’s relationships to modern attitudes and values.
The alternative modernity Tablighis enact is premised on key notions of
personhood and justice. Unlike the radically free human of modern
liberalism, freedom in Joygram is limited by dharma: the Joygrami
Muslim person gains individual freedom and ethical autonomy only after
the social generation of the ‘human person’ and submission to the
creator-god. Dharma may change within but continues to be the source
of ethics in all spheres of life, which includes secular (plural) life in the
modern world, especially when other sources of moral fabric seem absent
in an increasingly individualized, fragmented, and corrupted society.
However, if modern states and political categorizations continue to
exclude such alternative notions of society, then they will continue to
exclude Islamic reformism—and other ethical, revivalist, and social
movements that are not simply modern or anti-modern, but post-secular
or post-liberal in nature.
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